Human Factors Projects

The primary objective of the yard and terminal research is to determine the human factors aspects of railroad yard and terminal operations that can be changed to enhance safety. This research includes the manner in which specific jobs are performed, the design of the tools that are required to perform the job, and the circumstances in which the job is performed.

One-Person Remote Operations

Devices to remotely control locomotives in industrial settings, such as steel plants, have been in use for nearly twenty years. Until recently, the use of these devices was not a concern to the FRA since these industrial operations do not fall under FRA jurisdiction. However, in the early 1990's several railroads began to use this technology in yard operations that are within FRA jurisdiction. This technology has the potential to increase productivity and reduce labor costs by enabling a one-person crew to perform all of the functions that were previously performed by a two-person crew. However, there are concerns that this increase in productivity will also degrade safety due to increased workload and fatigue, and other human factors issues. This project will assess the change in accident/injury risk associated with remote operations relative to normal yard operations. The project has been expanded to include a root cause analysis of selected remote operations incidents. This project started in FY 2001 and is to be completed by FY 2005.

Ergonomic Issues and Root-cause Analysis in Yard & Terminal Injuries

Analyses of railroad supplementary injury and illness records in the Yard and Terminal Injury Evaluation project (completed in FY 2000) indicated that 25 percent of all injuries were due to trip/slip hazards, 23 percent were due to muscle strains, and 11 percent were due to lifting injuries. The Yard and Terminal Injury Evaluation project addressed the immediate causes of these injuries due to employee complacency and/or inadequate training, supervision, and safeguards. A follow-up, root-cause analysis of these injuries will now be performed to identify the chain-of-events that led to the immediate cause of the injury. Individual, environmental and managerial factors will be examined to formulate countermeasures to prevent the recurrence of similar injuries in the future. Some of these injuries may be due to poor ergonomic design and are preventable. This project will identify injuries with ergonomic causes and suggest means to remediate those causes. Among the topics to be addressed are switch stands, hand brakes, and belt packs used for the remote control of switching locomotives. This project (as did its predecessor, Yard and Terminal Injury Evaluation) also provides support to the Switching Operations Fatalities Analysis (SOFA) Working Group which has been examining the contributing factors to fatalities and serious injuries in switching operation. The project started in FY 2001 and is projected to continue until FY 2005.

Maintenance-of-Way Safety

Annually, approximately 10 percent of all on-duty casualties of railroad employees occur during maintenance-of-way operations. As is the case for yard and terminal casualties, anecdotal evidence indicates that there are four primary reasons for many of the incidents leading to these injuries:

• Employee complacency leading to inattention to safety considerations while performing familiar tasks,
• Inadequate training,
• Inadequate supervision, and
• Inadequate safeguards built into procedures and equipment.

The safety implications of fatigue will be a particular focus of this project. Sleep diaries have been distributed to maintenance of way employees and will allow an analysis of work / sleep patterns and fatigue. This project will identify improvements to reduce employee injuries and enhance safety. The project began in FY 2001 and is due to be completed in FY 2005.

Railroad Safety Culture: Behavior-Based Safety Process and Safety Rules Consolidation

Two projects are using the Behavior-Based Safety (BBS) Process, which applies behavioral analysis methods to attain continuous improvements in safety in industrial settings, to improve safety and change railroad safety culture. The BBS methodology identifies and observes safety-critical behaviors to provide positive peer-to-peer feedback for long-term, continuous improvements in safety. This approach has significantly reduced injury rates in many other industries. The success of this approach is not only driven by the systematic reduction of at-risk safety behaviors through peer-to-peer observation and feedback, but also by the systematic identification and mitigation of those organizational barriers (work environment factors, policies, procedures, etc.) which may stand in the way of reducing at-risk behaviors. Positive communication processes help establish commitment in the process at all levels of the organization, from senior managers to front line employees, often resulting in long-term changes in the “safety culture” of the organization. The Consolidation of Safety Rules project is another approach to improving railroad safety culture. Hundreds of safety rules written in the early 1900’s are outmoded and do not function well with the existing needs of modern railroading. On some railroads, outmoded safety rules have been identified as an organizational barrier to improving railroad safety. It is widely believed that these outmoded safety rules, in conjunction with a punitive disciplinary process, result in a “blame cycle” between management, labor unions, and employees and often discourage the identification and elimination of unsafe behaviors in the workplace. The overall goals of this project are to:

• Consolidate outdated safety rules into critical safety rules and guidelines for safety,
• Write general safety rules and guidelines focused on safety-related behaviors rather than situation-and-site specific rules,
• Include input from labor unions and line staff in the development of a new user-friendly safety rule book,
• Utilize this Safety Rules Consolidation Project as a means of effecting positive change in safety culture.

The BBS process will be used to attain these goals, and the recently established Safety Assurance and Compliance Process in FRA’s Office of Safety, a non-punitive partnership approach between the federal government, railroad management and railroad labor, will assist in implementation. These projects began in FY 2001 and are scheduled for completion in FY 2004.