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Testimony given by The Honorable Allan Rutter, Administrator

Chairman Quinn and members of the Subcommittee, I am very pleased to have the opportunity to be here today to testify on the important subject of the transportation of nuclear wastes. The Federal Railroad Administration (FRA), on behalf of the Secretary of Transportation, administers the Federal railroad safety laws, including those concerning the transportation of hazardous materials by rail. Ranking at the top of FRA’s priorities is the safety of rail shipments involving Spent Nuclear Fuel (SNF) and High-Level Radioactive Waste (HLRW). We believe that the Federal regulatory structure, planning, monitoring, coordination, and experience have produced a very safe system for the transportation of nuclear wastes by rail, but we understand the need to continue to improve that system to meet the new challenges posed by the expected increase in those shipments and the post-September 11th security environment.

The Safety Record for Rail Shipments of SNF

Rail shipments of Spent Nuclear Fuel (SNF) have a long and very positive safety history, having been transported safely by rail in the United States for more than 46 years. During that time, there has never been a single train accident or incident involving these rail shipments that has resulted in an injury, a death, or a release of the material from the packaging, and there has never been a single injury or death resulting from any rail shipment of radioactive material.

Approximately 1,200 packages of SNF have traversed our Nation’s railroad system since 1957, when the U.S. Navy began shipping SNF by rail. Since that time, the Navy has safely shipped a total of more than 800 packages of SNF in a total of more than 300 train movements. In 1989, Carolina Power and Light, now known as Progress Energy, began intra-utility transfers of SNF from its two operating commercial nuclear reactors to temporary storage at a third reactor facility operated by the company. In 1995, the U.S. Department of Energy began shipment of SNF as part of its Foreign Research Reactor Fuel Program, which is intended to safeguard SNF from research reactors around the world by moving it to the United States and which is an important element in the Nation’s nuclear non-proliferation efforts. As a result of these programs, the number of rail movements of SNF increased from approximately 15 per year in the early 1990s to an average of approximately 25 per year from the year 1997 to the present.

Rail Transportation of Radioactive Materials

Railroad transportation is well suited to moving radioactive materials safely and efficiently. Complementary Federal regulations issued by the Research and Special Programs Administration of the U.S. Department of Transportation and the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) provide for the shipment of even small amounts of SNF, to be transported in specially designed casks or other shipping containers that conform to NRC’s regulations for certified Type B packages. Because Type B shipping casks are designed to withstand severe accident impacts without significant release of radioactive material or increase in radiation dose levels, the casks are typically constructed using thick stainless steel walls and heavy shielding materials, such as lead or depleted uranium. The result is spent fuel casks that are relatively heavy, and that have a high cask weight to payload ratio. The rail shipment of SNF presents an attractive choice over truck shipment because of the higher weight limits for rail versus highway, and the greater efficiency in cask weight to payload for rail casks.

To get a sense of the great efficiencies that can be achieved by moving high-level nuclear materials by rail, consider the data projections presented in the environmental impact statement (EIS) for the Yucca Mountain site. During the 24-year period covered by the EIS, there would be a total of approximately 10,700 rail shipments of SNF, which means that there would be about 150 train movements carrying up to a total of 450 shipments (three cask shipments per train) annually. To carry this same quantity of SNF by truck would require about 53,000 shipments over 24 years, which equates to 2,200 highway movements (one cask shipment per truck) annually. In short, the choice is between 150 train movements per year and 2,200 truck movements per year. The inherent efficiency of rail transportation in moving SNF has a direct bearing on safety, because fewer shipments of nuclear materials lessen not only the exposure to the general public and transportation industry personnel but also the opportunity for a transportation incident.

Furthermore, a consortium of commercial nuclear power producers anticipates that it will initiate anywhere from 50 rail movements (four casks per train) to 100 rail movements (two casks per train) of SNF per year to temporary storage facilities, possibly as early as the year 2006. Therefore, even without any Yucca Mountain shipments, rail shipments of SNF are potentially destined to increase sharply from existing levels.

Promoting Rail Safety: Federal, State, and Local Interagency Effort To ensure the continued safe and secure transportation of nuclear materials by rail, FRA works as part of a multi-agency team that includes, among others, the following Federal agencies: the Department of Energy (DOE); the NRC; the Transportation Security Administration and Federal Emergency Management Agency of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS); and two sister agencies of the Department of Transportation, the Research and Special Programs Administration (RSPA) and the Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration (FMCSA). We also work closely with various State governmental organizations, including The Council of State Governments, the Western Governors’ Association, and the Southern States Energy Board.

DOE, of course, has broad responsibilities in this area, including planning and arranging for the transportation of SNF and HLRW. This entails providing physical protection during DOE shipments of SNF. NRC, in addition to licensing nuclear facilities, certifies shipping casks for spent fuel, and reviews and approves physical protection arrangements for SNF shipments conducted by its licensees. RSPA sets the standards for the safe transportation of all hazardous materials, which include SNF and HLRW as regulated radioactive materials. RSPA’s relevant standards cover hazard communication, shipment documentation, packaging safety, training, and, as of March 2003, security plans. FMCSA oversees the safety and routing of shipments by highway.

FRA’s General Role in Promoting Rail Safety

In general, FRA establishes safety standards concerning the design, maintenance, and inspection of many aspects of our Nation’s railroad system, including track, motive power and equipment, signal and train control systems, operating practices, and transportation of hazardous material. Railroads are required to conduct their own inspections to ensure that these safety standards are being met. FRA leads a cadre of roughly 500 Federal and State safety inspectors, excluding specialists, whose role is not to conduct safety inspections for the railroad companies, but rather to monitor the railroad companies’ own inspection forces to ascertain whether or not the railroads are in compliance with applicable Federal safety standards. FRA and State inspectors accomplish this task by conducting routine, random, and programmed focused inspections of railroad properties and comparing their findings to a railroad’s own inspection records. Thus, while primary responsibility for inspecting the railroad property and operations rests with the railroads themselves, FRA’s inspection strategy is to ensure the integrity and effectiveness of the railroads’ own inspection programs.

FRA’s Role in Promoting the Safety of Radioactive Shipments by Rail

With regard to rail transportation of SNF and HLRW in particular, FRA conducts inspections to verify that shipments are properly prepared for rail transportation and in compliance with all applicable hazardous materials regulations. FRA also helps to ensure that the track, signal systems, grade crossings, bridges, and rail vehicles used for these shipments are in safe condition and that responsible railroad employees involved in these movements are trained, briefed, and properly performing their jobs. In these activities, FRA works very closely with the railroads, their employees, and the affected communities. Ultimately, the safe movement of SNF and HLRW depends on the application of sound safety regulations, policies, and procedures. This requires extensive planning and coordination among Federal agencies, State and local governments, and commercial transportation companies. In the mid-1980s, partly as a result of the rail shipments from the Three Mile Island Nuclear Power Plant, FRA implemented a basic focused inspection policy for all known rail shipments of SNF and HLRW. Taking a proactive approach to railroad safety, FRA recognized the need to enhance this policy to ensure that the railroad industry’s outstanding safety record for nuclear material shipments could continue unabated despite the sharp increase in such shipments. Therefore, in 1998, FRA developed the Safety Compliance Oversight Plan for Rail Transportation of High-Level Radioactive Waste and Spent Nuclear Fuel, known as SCOP, which set forth an enhanced FRA policy to address the safety of rail shipments of SNF and HLRW. Although the SCOP was originally developed to support the DOE’s Foreign Research Reactor Fuel Program, FRA believes that this enhanced policy is necessary to ensure the safety of all known future rail shipments of SNF and HLRW, which are destined to increase significantly, with or without the opening of Yucca Mountain.

Development of the SCOP involved a coordinated effort among FRA, DOE, the Association of American Railroads (AAR), railroad labor organizations, and representatives of affected States and Native American groups. FRA wishes to acknowledge the invaluable contribution of its safety partners, whose insight and wisdom were instrumental in formulating the policies and procedures that are incorporated into the SCOP.

Key elements of the SCOP include (1) coordinated planning of the most appropriate and viable routes, (2) ensuring appropriate training of railroad employees and emergency responders, and (3) enhancing and focusing FRA’s safety inspections and monitoring activities on all facets of the rail shipments of SNF and HLRW.

Under route-planning provisions of the SCOP, FRA works with DOE, utility companies, or other shippers, and the involved railroad companies in planning and selecting the routes, emphasizing the selection of the highest classes of track. (FRA regulations define various classes of track; each class of track has a maximum allowable operating speed and specific design, maintenance, and inspection requirements. The higher the class of track, the higher the permissible operating speed and the more stringent the safety standards.) In addition, FRA prepares an accident-prediction model for the highway-rail grade crossings along the intended route and uses this model to assist the shipper (including DOE if it is the shipper), in coordinating with appropriate State, local, and tribal agencies in route-planning activities. FRA also coordinates with Operation Lifesaver, Inc., a private safety organization, to increase grade crossing safety awareness and education in communities along routes. We also work with appropriate agencies of the DHS, the NRC and the DOT’s Office of Intelligence and Security in identifying security issues and measures, and assist with coordination between the offeror, Federal and local law enforcement representatives, and intelligence communities on security matters. Finally, FRA reviews the emergency response plans of the shipper and the rail carrier to ensure that they adequately address the actions to be taken along the route in the unlikely event of an accident or incident involving the train.

Another important element of the SCOP is training. It is FRA’s policy to assist DOE and other shippers in the development of emergency response training and safety briefings and to monitor the rail carrier and the shipper to verify that requisite training and briefings have been performed. FRA also conducts reviews to ensure that train crews who operate the trains in which nuclear materials are transported are properly certified, trained, and experienced in running over the routes. Finally, FRA checks to see that these crews have received specific training concerning the nature of the shipments.

As explained earlier, FRA’s safety inspection program is primarily designed to monitor the safety performance of railroads, which are responsible for performing their own inspections and ensuring the safety of their operations. However, under the SCOP, FRA plays a more direct role by conducting more focused and intensive safety inspections to ensure the highest level of safety for rail shipments of SNF and HLRW. For example, instead of inspecting a limited sample of locomotives and freight cars as we do for routine rail operations, FRA equipment inspectors conduct a thorough inspection of each and every locomotive and freight car for every train that transports SNF. These inspections are intended to ensure that locomotives, freight cars, and the train’s braking systems meet all applicable Federal safety standards. Furthermore, along a route, it is FRA’s policy to observe the operation of automated warning devices at highway-rail grade crossings, to ascertain that they are operational before the shipment. FRA signal inspectors also conduct inspections of selected grade crossing warning devices to determine the reliability and integrity of the grade crossing warning system. Furthermore, FRA places operating practices experts in the rail carriers’ dispatching centers during SNF shipments to observe firsthand the progress of the shipments and any operational problems that might arise. It is also FRA’s policy to inspect all the track along the entire route of a shipment; this includes both visual inspections and automated inspections by FRA’s track geometry vehicle (the T-2000), which is capable of measuring the alignment, gage, and crosslevel of every foot of railroad track. In addition, FRA reviews the data resulting from the inspections by the rail carrier’s rail flaw detection vehicle to ensure that rail flaw inspections have been performed on the route and that necessary rail repairs have been made prior to the shipments.

It must be emphasized that the SCOP is a living document that has evolved from more than 46 years of accumulated experience regarding the safe movement of nuclear materials by rail. FRA will continue to work in partnership with the rail community and other affected entities to review, evaluate, and update the SCOP periodically to keep pace with the latest developments and technologies involving safe rail transportation in order to continue to ensure the safe and secure movement of nuclear materials over the Nation’s rail system.

In order to carry out FRA’s safety inspection policies under the SCOP more effectively, FRA has in recent years sought and obtained additional budgetary resources. For FY 2003, FRA received funding to hire eight more safety inspectors. For FY 2004, FRA obtained resources to hire 21 new safety inspectors for the field, an additional bridge engineer and a new radioactive transportation coordinator for headquarters, as well as to obtain an additional track geometry vehicle that FRA will now be able to develop and use. We are in the process of moving forward to fill all of these new positions. For FY 2005, we are requesting funds for additional staff in the Office of Safety, including eight operating practices inspectors and one hazardous materials security specialist for headquarters. We are also seeking funding for FY 2005 to pay for a third track geometry vehicle. These additional resources will help FRA implement the SCOP more effectively and thereby meet the rail safety challenge posed by the anticipated increased volume of radioactive material shipments.

Federal Jurisdictional Issues

In DOE’s Final EIS for the Yucca Mountain site, DOE identified “mostly rail” as its preferred mode of transportation, and in its December 2003 Federal Register notice, DOE announced the primary and secondary preferred rail corridors for the construction of a rail line to serve Yucca Mountain. Having now identified its preferred corridor, DOE has indicated that it intends to proceed with selection of a mode of transportation and, if it selects mostly rail as the transportation mode in Nevada, DOE will proceed to actual selection of a corridor. These selections will also be published in the Federal Register in a Record of Decision. If DOE proceeds with mostly rail in Nevada and makes a corridor selection, DOE will take further steps, including the development of an EIS on the particular railway alignment within the corridor.

The Subcommittee has asked that FRA specifically address Federal jurisdictional issues regarding possible construction of a new rail line to reach Yucca Mountain, should DOE decide to use rail as the primary mode of transport to Yucca Mountain. I anticipate that the Surface Transportation Board’s testimony will address the scope of its jurisdiction over the construction of rail lines.

If DOE decides to use rail as the primary mode of transport to Yucca Mountain and if STB provides any necessary approval of the construction of a rail line to Yucca Mountain, DOE would seem to have several alternatives for how it might construct the rail line and conduct operations over it. DOE’s options could include the following: owning and operating the entire line itself; owning the entire line and having it operated by a contractor, using either DOE owned rolling stock or otherwise; having the line entirely owned and operated by an existing railroad; having the line owned and operated by a newly created railroad; or some mix of these arrangements (e.g., having a major railroad own and operate the entire new line outside the Federal facility, with DOE owning and operating the portion of the line within its facility). DOE could also decide whether or not to permit other types of rail traffic on the portion of the line outside the Federal facility. We believe that DOE is probably not in a position to select one of these options unless and until it decides that rail would be the primary mode of transport to Yucca Mountain. Until DOE’s decisions are made, FRA cannot state precisely how it would exercise its safety jurisdiction.

However, regardless of which option DOE selects, FRA’s rail safety jurisdiction is broad enough to include those operations. FRA’s jurisdiction under the Federal railroad safety laws extends to all railroads that affect interstate or foreign commerce (see 49 U.S.C. § 20102), whether or not they are common carriers (except for self-contained urban rapid transit systems not connected to the general railroad system) and to every area of railroad safety (see 49 U.S.C. § 20103).

In exercising its safety jurisdiction, FRA may not be able to use some of its enforcement tools (e.g., civil and criminal penalties) directly against DOE concerning any direct actions it performs as part of the rail operation, due to the wording of the Federal railroad safety statutes. However, we are confident that if DOE selects a rail option, DOE would be fully cooperative in achieving practical solutions to any rail safety problems attributable to its own actions. Moreover, any commercial entities (e.g., railroads and contractors) involved with the rail operation would be fully subject to all of FRA’s enforcement remedies.

FRA will consider entering into a memorandum of understanding with DOE concerning how FRA and DOE would address any safety issues that might arise in connection with the rail operation, should rail be chosen as the preferred mode. Such an agreement could focus on the specifics of the option chosen and methods for resolving safety problems FRA might identify. With or without such an agreement, FRA intends to exercise its jurisdiction to ensure that every rail safety issue is fully addressed.

Safety and Security Protocols

Federal regulations for shipment of nuclear material by rail are augmented by a series of safety and security protocols and special operating restrictions that have been agreed upon by DOE and the railroads. These protocols and operating restrictions have evolved over the years and are often tailored to the particular needs of the individual shipments. Under these protocols, a train carrying SNF or HLRW would typically include the cask cars, at least two buffer cars, and an escort car. One buffer car is before and one is after the cask cars; the buffer cars are required by regulation and provide not only separation from the occupied locomotive and from the escort car but also a cushion against direct impacts on the cask cars in the highly unlikely event of a collision. The escort car would be staffed with appropriate security and nuclear safety personnel. Special operating restrictions have included limitations on the maximum speed of trains carrying nuclear materials, requirements to stop opposing trains on adjacent tracks when they meet a train carrying nuclear materials, and requirements that cars carrying nuclear material be switched only with an attached locomotive rather than allowing them to roll to a stop on their own during switching.

Another convention involving the shipment of SNF and HLRW by rail concerns the use of dedicated trains. Until the mid-1970s, most rail shipments of these radioactive materials were handled in regular service trains that carried a wide variety of other freight in addition to radioactive materials. In 1974, the railroad industry began insisting that radioactive materials shipments move in dedicated trains that transport nothing but radioactive material. There has been much debate about this topic over the years; while many nuclear materials shipments do move in dedicated trains today, this is not the case for all such shipments. (In 1977, the Surface Transportation Board’s predecessor, the Interstate Commerce Commission, issued a decision that prevented railroads from mandating the use of dedicated trains.) FRA has engaged the services of the John A.Volpe National Transportation Systems Center to conduct a thorough study, as mandated by Congress, of the safety implications surrounding the transportation of SNF and HLRW in dedicated trains versus regular service trains. FRA has received a draft of this study and is diligently working to review and clear the draft and then forward it through the appropriate channels in the Executive Branch so the report can be approved, issued, and provided to Congress as required. We hope to deliver the study to Congress this year. As also directed by Congress, the Department will consider the results of the study and evaluate whether or not rulemaking is necessary.

The security of rail shipments of radioactive materials has long been a priority even before the tragic events of September 11th. Some of the protocols described above contain stringent security measures to protect against terrorist threats, including the accompaniment of these shipments by armed security forces, direct liaison with State and local law enforcement and first responders, and requirements to protect the cars when sitting in rail yards or sidings.

More recently, Global Positioning System (GPS) technology is being used to track the location of trains carrying radioactive materials. FRA is leading an effort of the Department of Transportation and the U.S. Coast Guard to build a Nationwide Differential Global Positioning System (NDGPS) that can greatly improve the accuracy of conventional GPS to one to two meters. This level of precision permits the system’s user to determine exactly which track (where there are adjacent tracks) a train is occupying. Our goal is to have dual NDGPS coverage for the entire United States. Presently, 85 percent of the continental United States has NDGPS coverage, while 45 percent has dual NDGPS coverage.

Although security concerns have long played a prominent role in assuring the safety of rail shipments of radioactive materials, the events of September 11th have reinforced the fact that we must constantly reassess our assumptions and beliefs. A few weeks after the attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon, the AAR secured the services of an experienced security firm to conduct a comprehensive review and assessment of the security of our Nation’s freight railroad system. The security of hazardous materials, including radioactive materials, and defense-related shipments are two areas that have received special emphasis in the security review.

Nothing that we do in transportation can ignore the threats to security posed by terrorist organizations. The Federal agencies responsible for direction or oversight of these movements have worked successfully over the years through the Governors’ offices of the respective States to ensure that emergency planning and emergency response agencies have the information and training they need to do their jobs. This sharing of information and cooperation must continue. However, it will be particularly important that specific information regarding routes and timing of individual shipments is kept secure by those with a need to know. Notwithstanding this desire, NRC has indicated to us that under section 147 of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, the NRC is barred from prohibiting public disclosure of information pertaining to the routes and quantities of shipments of SNF and HLRW. The Department of Transportation and other participating Federal, State, and local law enforcement and security agencies, including FRA, will continue to evaluate best practices to address security concerns.

Conclusion

FRA believes that it is critical that rail shipments of high-level radioactive materials continue to be conducted with a maximum degree of safety and security. This can be accomplished only through a sound and meaningful safety partnership involving all relevant elements of the nuclear industry, the railroad community, and appropriate Federal, State, and local governmental bodies. Our current safety requirements and practices have evolved over a period of more than 46 years. We must build upon the knowledge and experience we have gained over that period to meet the challenges that are likely to arise with the projected increase in rail shipments of SNF and high-level radioactive materials in today’s railroad environment. New challenges will arise regardless of whether or when the Yucca Mountain storage facility becomes operational, and when they do, FRA and its many partners are determined to be prepared to meet these challenges successfully.