Testimony given by The Honorable Allan Rutter, Administrator
The Department of Transportation appreciates the opportunity to appear before the Subcommittee on Transportation Appropriations to discuss the issue of cargo security. Our Nation has entered a new era of security awareness since September 11th and nowhere is that felt more strongly than in the field of transportation. Secretary Mineta is working aggressively to build the security foundation the country needs in this new era, from aviation to railways, highways, pipelines and waterways. The Department is working with its partners in state and local law enforcement, other government agencies, industry and labor and with the leadership and Members of the Congress.
Thanks to your help, we are making great strides in addressing one of our most critical transportation security challenges, cargo security, but we need to do more. While the most pressing security challenges have been met with existing authorities, we now must work to build a new network of protections, one that transforms what has been a rapid response into a sustained effort that recognizes heightened security as a part of normal operations. In addition, cargo security depends on the users of the system, shippers and operators, and affects the trade corridors they use.
The new threats and opportunities of the 21st century demand a new approach to border management. The United States has a 7,500-mile land and air border shared with Canada and Mexico and an exclusive economic zone encompassing 3.4 million square miles. Each year, 11.2 million trucks and 2.2 million rail cars cross into the United States, while 7,500 foreign-flag ships make 51,000 calls in U.S. ports. The massive flow of people and goods across our borders helps drive our economy, but can also serve as a conduit for terrorists, weapons of mass destruction, illegal migrants, contraband, and other unlawful commodities.
President Bush envisions a border that is grounded on two key principles:
First, America's air, land, and sea borders must provide a strong defense for the American people against all external threats, most importantly international terrorists but also drugs, foreign disease, and other dangerous items.
Second, America's border must be highly efficient, posing little or no obstacle to legitimate trade and travel.
America requires a cargo management system that keeps pace with expanding trade while protecting the United States and its territories from the threats of terrorist attack, illegal immigration, illegal drugs, and other contraband. The border of the future must integrate actions abroad to screen goods and people prior to their arrival in sovereign U.S. territory, and inspections at the border and measures within the United States to ensure compliance with entry and import permits. Federal border control agencies must have seamless information-sharing systems that allow for coordinated communication among themselves and also the broader law enforcement and intelligence gathering communities. This integrated system would provide timely enforcement of laws and regulations. The use of advanced technology to track the movement of cargo and the entry and exit of individuals is essential to the task of managing the movement of hundreds of millions of individuals, conveyances, and vehicles.
Agreements with our neighbors, major trading partners, and private industry will allow extensive pre-screening of low-risk traffic, thereby allowing limited assets to focus attention on high-risk traffic. Some of this work has already begun with Canada, our largest trading partner. On December 12, 2001, Governor Tom Ridge, Director of the Office of Homeland Security, and John Manley, then Canada's Minister of Foreign Affairs, signed the "Smart Border Declaration" with a 30-point action plan that will help speed and secure the flow of people and goods between the United States and Canada. The Smart Border Declaration recognizes that "our current and future prosperity and security depend on a border that operates efficiently and effectively under all circumstances." A similar effort is currently underway with Mexico.
The struggle against terrorism is a truly national struggle. Federal, State, and local government agencies, as well as the private sector must work seamlessly together. Having the right system of communication - content, process, and infrastructure - is critical to bridging the existing gaps between the Federal, State, and local governments, as well as the private sector. These new systems will greatly assist our officials at all levels to protect and defend against future terrorist attacks, and to effectively manage incidents whenever they should occur.
To help meet these needs, the Administration has established a uniform national threat advisory system, announced last week by the Office of Homeland Security, to inform Federal agencies, State and local officials, as well as the private sector, of terrorist threats and appropriate protective actions. The President's Budget for fiscal year 2003 supports this effort by funding the development and implementation of secure information systems to streamline the dissemination of critical homeland security information.
Likewise, the Department of Transportation, through the new Transportation Security Administration (TSA), will be making every effort to ensure the security of cargo, including containerized cargo, as it moves throughout America's intermodal transportation system. With its Congressionally mandated deadlines, TSA has been focusing primarily on aviation-related security issues. However, in the months ahead, the new organization will be devoting substantial attention to maritime and surface transportation-related security.
Although much attention was rightfully focused on aviation following the September 11th attacks, the Department of Transportation took decisive steps to address the issue of security in all the surface modes of transportation as well. In addition to the U.S. Coast Guard's quick response to guard the security of American ports and waterways, Secretary Mineta established the National Infrastructure Security Committee (NISC). Through several direct action groups, the NISC was tasked with evaluating transportation infrastructure vulnerabilities, security protocols and processes and recommending changes to improve security. As part of the President's USA Freedom Corps, the Department is working with the Department of Justice on a ten-city pilot test of the Terrorist Information and Prevention System (TIPS) that will use transportation workers, letter carriers and others as part of a system for reporting suspicious terrorist activity. If the pilot tests are successful, the program will be expanded.
From the direct action group process, other groups have been formed to tackle very specific security issues. Among these is the Container Working Group - established through the NISC in December. The Container Working group is co-chaired with the U.S. Customs Service and includes representatives from the Departments of Defense, Energy, Commerce, Justice, Agriculture, Health and Human Services (FDA) and others. The group has oversight from the Office of Homeland Security.
The Container Working Group is tasked with providing recommendations to improve the secure movement of the six million marine containers that enter our nation's ports and the eleven million truck and rail containers that cross the Mexican and Canadian borders into America each year in a way that is safe and efficient. In order to address individual aspects of container security, four subgroups of the Container Working Group are studying information systems, security technologies, business practices, and international affairs. On the front lines of container security is the U.S. Customs Service, as well as other federal agencies. The Container Working Group is studying technologies and business practices that will enable Customs and others to prevent high-risk containers from entering the United States or to ensure that they are properly inspected before they pose a threat to the United States. Although the Customs Service utilizes a thoughtful risk-based selection method, preventing a container from being used as a weapon requires a more complex strategy, enhancing the non-intrusive inspection technology and information used for selection. The new Customs Container Security Initiative builds upon previous work with our international trading partners to improve container security throughout the world's global supply chain.
This work is of critical importance, especially in the maritime arena. Approximately 95 percent of our Nation's non-NAFTA international trade moves by water. During a major military deployment, 90 percent of our military materials move through our nation's seaports. Preserving those assets and protecting the safety of the men and women who use them and the communities near them has been, and continues to be, one of the Administration's top priorities. To accomplish this priority, a new partnership must be formed. A partnership between the commercial maritime industry and government must take advantage of existing commercial security systems, information systems and technological innovations.
Even with our best efforts, our current transportation system is groaning under capacity constraints and congestion in many ports is increasing. To further complicate matters, container traffic, even with the current economic slowdown, is predicted to double in the next twenty years. Improving efficiency is one of the key ways to help solve these capacity and congestion problems. Yet efficiency improvements must now be looked at through a security lens. Our transportation system will need to operate both efficiently and securely. These twin goals of efficiency and security need to be addressed simultaneously.
In summary, the vast volume of trade and traffic through our nation's ports and across its borders has put immense pressure on our ability to enforce the nation's laws while facilitating international trade, even before September 11th. After September 11th, our challenge has risen to a new level. Notably cargo trade, which is critical to this country's economic strength, continues to move through ports with minimal interruption. It is no surprise that sustaining mobility will come at a higher cost to all of us as we harden our borders. The reality is that we are an open society and we cherish our freedoms. Ultimately, it is incumbent upon our government and our transportation industry partners to find the balance between appropriate security measures and the unimpeded movement of cargo.
Cargo Security in the Maritime Sector
An analysis of our transportation system in the aftermath of the events of September 11, 2001 clearly laid bare the susceptibility of container shipments as a delivery system for an enemy's weapons. Prior to September 11th, DOT's primary concern was the efficient movement of these containers through the transportation system. The advent of just-in-time business processes and the use of the transportation system as a rolling inventory tied the transportation system even more integrally into the economic vitality of this country.
The Department was well equipped with existing statutory authority to develop the immediate maritime security response our Nation has required. These steps have formed the core of our near-term response to the new maritime and port security environment, and have been based on current authority and existing resources.
A number of critical steps have been taken since September 11:
The Coast Guard has refocused resources to protect high consequence targets in the marine environment, including critical bridges, port facilities and other infrastructure.
The Coast Guard has issued emergency regulations requiring 96-hour advance notices of arrival for ships arriving in U.S. ports, and we expect to make that regulation permanent by the summer of 2002.
The Coast Guard Intelligence Coordination Center, working with the Office of Naval Intelligence, has been tracking inbound high-interest vessels and providing intelligence on the people, cargoes and vessels to operational commanders and interested agencies.
The Coast Guard has deployed personnel as Sea Marshals and small boat escorts to ensure positive control of vessels containing critical cargoes and in sensitive areas.
The Maritime Administration has been meeting with members of the maritime industry to examine and address security issues and make recommendations regarding legislation and policy changes.
The Maritime Administration has heightened security at its Ready Reserve Force fleet sites and outport locations as well as activated one ship to assist in Operation Enduring Freedom.
The Maritime Administration, Credential Direct Action Group and the Transportation Security Administration GO Teams are working to examine ways that advanced technologies, including smart card, biometrics and public key infrastructure can be used throughout the maritime and related industries in order to accurately identify employees working in security-sensitive areas.
The St. Lawrence Seaway Development Corporation has been working closely with its Canadian counterpart and the Coast Guard to heighten security on the St. Lawrence River and ensure the protection of ocean access to our Great Lakes ports.
In order to address the security issues surrounding the movement of marine cargo containers through the international, intermodal transportation system, the interagency Container Working Group has been examining ways of improving the coordination of government and business efforts as they relate to container security; enhancing data collection; improving the physical security of containers; initiating activities on the international front; and considering all possible uses of advanced technologies to improve the profiling of containers and to increase the physical security of containers.
Working with other port entities, the Coast Guard is developing tracking mechanisms for all vessels operating in the maritime domain: within or transiting to U.S. ports and transiting our coastal waters. The heart of this maritime domain awareness program is accurate information, intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance of all vessels, cargo, and people extending well beyond our traditional maritime boundaries. Coast Guard forces will provide enhanced defenses for critical high-risk vessels and coastal facilities, marine and otherwise (e.g. nuclear power plants, oil refineries). Close coordination through Harbor Safety Committees, which help bring together the many local, State, and Federal agencies that maintain and protect the harbor, will ensure a well-balanced protective envelope is sustained at different threat levels.
The Coast Guard has also reorganized its security programs, which were dispersed throughout the Office of Marine Safety, Security and Environmental Protection, and consolidated them under a new port security directorate. This includes the movement of the container inspection program, which was focused on the structural integrity of containers and the proper shipment of hazardous materials, to add a security element to its safety inspections. The Container Inspection Training Assistance Team (CITAT) was deployed to New York City following the attacks and assisted in inspecting numerous containers following the "just in time" training they received from the U.S. Army.
The President's 2003 Budget increases funding for the Coast Guard's homeland security-related missions (protecting ports and coastal areas, as well as interdiction activities) by $282 million, to an overall level of $2.9 billion. After September 11, the Coast Guard's port security mission grew from approximately 1-2 percent of daily operations to between 50-60 percent during the heightened threat periods. Today the port security mission is about 15 percent. In addition, the Coast Guard has important national security missions such as illegal immigration and drug interdiction and port security.
Equally important in improving port security has been the Department's partnering efforts with the international community. At a recent International Maritime Organization Assembly and intersessional working group meetings, the Coast Guard, as the lead agency for the U.S. delegation, introduced numerous security measures for consideration including vessel, facility and offshore platform security plans, early implementation of automatic identification system transponders for certain ships on international voyages and designation of and training for ship, company and facility security officers. The U.S. Government also introduced some preliminary container security measures for consideration with the promise to provide more detailed papers for the Maritime Safety Committee meeting in May 2002 based upon the recommendations of the interagency container working group and Customs' Container Initiative.
Grant Program for Improvement of Port Infrastructure:
The Department of Defense Appropriations Act for FY 2002 appropriated $93.3 million to the Transportation Security Administration to award competitive grants to critical national seaports to finance the cost of enhancing facility and operational security. Such grants are to be awarded based on the need for security assessments and enhancements as determined by the Under Secretary of Transportation for Security, the Administrator of the Maritime Administration, and the Commandant of the Coast Guard. The final grant approval body will be a board consisting of the Under Secretary of Transportation for Security, the Administrator of the Maritime Administration, and the Commandant of the Coast Guard, or their representatives. Determination of grant awards will be based on consideration of the most urgent needs from a homeland security perspective. It is anticipated that initial awards will commence in June 2002. Port authorities will be able to submit grant applications electronically through a Departmental website. A small amount of this money will fund "proof of concept projects," focusing on critical seaports. Preference will also be given to ports that have already begun port security enhancement through some demonstrated action. We are moving very quickly to put this money to work.
Cargo Security in the Motor Carrier Sector
In response to terrorist threats to the transportation system, the Federal Motor Carrier Safety Administration (FMCSA) initiated a program of onsite visits to hazardous materials carriers and businesses to increase their awareness of terrorist threats, to identify potential weaknesses in carrier security programs, and to report potentially serious security issues to the appropriate authorities. Since September 26, FMCSA's credentialed field staff have completed almost 41,000 Security Sensitivity Visits (SSVs) throughout the country, focusing on companies transporting hazardous materials in types and quantities that terrorists could use as a weapon, truck driver training schools, truck rental and leasing firms, chemical and petroleum facilities, hazardous materials shippers, and other operations that could be at risk.
In SSVs, FMCSA personnel meet directly with top company officials to review security measures and identify areas for tightening procedures. The SSV also includes a records review to identify any suspicious activities by carrier employees that could affect security. To date, 128 referrals of suspicious activities have been forwarded to the FBI for follow-up. False names or false personnel information, suspicious inquiries or inappropriate comments, unexplained absences, and citizenship irregularities are among the activities that provide a basis for referral. Company officials are being urged to conduct thorough interviews when hiring new drivers and to verify U.S. citizenship or appropriate immigration status. In reviewing their security procedures, management is asked to consider who might have access to their facilities and storage areas and the adequacy of protection. Carriers are urged to know their business partners, vendors, service providers, and their shippers.
FMCSA urges carriers to avoid transporting particularly hazardous materials near high population centers whenever possible and reinforces the need to strictly adhere to en route security procedures. Companies are informed about technical advances that can improve security and communication, such as satellite tracking, surveillance systems, and cell phones, as well as state-of-the-art locks and seals, alarms, and engine controls.
In the future, FMCSA hopes to conduct operational tests of technologies that could enhance the security of hazardous materials transportation to demonstrate the potential effectiveness of these systems. Technologies which could be tested include systems for preventing unauthorized drivers from operating a vehicle, systems for detecting a vehicle that is off-route, systems to remotely shut-off the vehicle engine, and systems that allow law enforcement, shippers, and consignees to make positive identification of the proper truck driver.
Enhanced communications systems provide another opportunity for improving security. A good communications system can help detect patterns of activities that when taken alone may not seem significant but when taken as a whole may cause concern. Security reminders and training should be regularly and widely provided to employees and should be comprehensive, covering overall company security, specific procedures, and the employee's personal role in security.
The SSV Program is only one component of the agency's program to promote the secure transportation of hazardous materials. In the future, compliance reviews of hazardous materials carriers will be expanded to include a security component. FMCSA is also developing a program for periodic visits to carriers transporting certain types of explosives, radioactive materials, and highly toxic substances. These visits will be more in-depth and include an on-site inspection of facilities and a written report with security recommendations.
The law enforcement community is an important partner in FMCSA's effort to enhance cargo security. FMCSA has developed outreach material and a training course to raise the awareness of law enforcement officers to the potential threat that commercial vehicles can pose if they are used as a weapon. With the Commercial Vehicle Safety Alliance (CVSA), the International Association of Chiefs of Police (IACP), the Maryland State Police, and the Virginia State Police, FMCSA developed a Security Awareness for Enforcement Checklist. The IACP is distributing 500,000 of these checklists to law enforcement officers across the country. FMCSA also is offering a free 8-hour training course, "Trucks & Terrorism," to law enforcement agencies.
In another outreach effort, the Teamsters, CVSA, IACP, and the Maryland State Police are working with FMCSA to inform truck drivers about measures they can take to protect themselves from potential terrorist hijackers.
Many states have either experienced instances of fraudulent activity within their Commercial Driver's License (CDL) programs or have testing and licensing practices that make them susceptible to fraud. Fraudulent licensing schemes come in many forms; language interpreters, State employees, and third party testers have all been involved. FMCSA is providing funding to States to reduce vulnerabilities in their CDL programs and is working closely with States and American Association of Motor Vehicle Administrators (AAMVA) on a special task force on identification security. We are committed to eliminating fraud in the CDL program and are examining the specific actions and resources that will be needed to accomplish this.
FMCSA is developing new regulations to implement background checks for hazardous materials drivers as specified in the USA PATRIOT legislation. FMCSA is also considering whether additional hazardous materials rulemakings would enhance the security of the motor carrier industry.
In addition to security in freight transportation, FMCSA is concerned about the vulnerability of the commercial passenger carrier industry to acts of violence. Today, except when crossing the border, passengers travel without requirements for identification, and baggage is not routinely screened. Yet motorcoaches travel in close proximity to some of the Nation's most visible and populated sites, such as sporting events and tourist attractions. FMCSA is working with charter and scheduled motorcoach operators to identify additional measures such as training, enhanced communications, passenger identification procedures, and security equipment and technologies to reduce the vulnerability of this vital transportation industry, which carries the highest volume of passengers of any mode.
While FMCSA has placed a special emphasis on increased security programs, critical safety enforcement activities have continued, including issuance of out-of-service orders, conducting compliance reviews, and complaint investigation. Enforcement targeted at carriers exhibiting poor safety performance will continue to be a major focus for FMCSA.
Cargo Security in the Rail Sector
The Federal Railroad Administration's (FRA) broad safety authority and expertise in railroad safety and operational issues give it a significant role to play in helping to analyze and address security threats as they relate to rail transportation, including intermodal transportation. FRA, engaged with other modes in DOT, is investigating the availability and applicability of technological devices for rail cars and intermodal vehicles that can track the car, detect attempts to intrude into the cargo space, and provide remotely controlled locks for cargo doors (for packaged freight) and valves and hoppers (for bulk freight). Remote locks can enhance security by remaining closed until released by a radio signal from a secure location. Satellite positioning devices could further enhance security by verifying that the vehicle is at its proper destination before the locks are released.
Since September 11, FRA has been coordinating with freight, intercity passenger, and commuter railroads, railroad industry groups, railroad labor unions, and shippers of hazardous materials by railroad to review current security programs.
The freight railroad industry has established task forces to study security threats to their physical assets, to train operations, to information technology systems, to high-value and dangerous cargoes, and to national security shipments. A classified study in draft form is now under review and future actions by FRA and the industry will use these critical action team analyses to plan enhancements to the increased security already in place. Similar studies are underway within the short-line and regional railroads and by the commuter rail carriers.
Working with FRA, individual railroads have already increased inspections and surveillance at sensitive locations such as bridges and terminals.
In the coming months, FRA will study the findings in the vulnerability assessments already underway. The rail transportation of chemicals for American and foreign industries is vital to the global economy and, thus, to the larger security of the United States. While it is impossible to eliminate the risk of terrorist attack on our railroad transportation infrastructure, FRA is committed to using its assets as efficiently as possible to improve the already superb record of rail transportation safety. FRA has begun the steps to establish an on-going dialogue with America's chemical shippers to coordinate rail security efforts among shippers and carriers. Finally, FRA will examine the progress that can be made on three fronts: First, by enhancing the ability of rail carriers and the Federal government to track known risks such as shipments of highly volatile or poisonous hazardous materials. Second, by improving the ability of the railroads and of law enforcement to detect undeclared dangerous cargoes. Third, by working with the safety and security community to reinforce the training given to Federal safety and enforcement personnel so that they can detect suspicious parameters and more easily identify a security threat.
Working with the Research and Special Programs Administration, the Department has prepared legislation (introduced as S. 1669) that includes such security enhancements as allowing Federal inspectors to remove a shipment of dangerous goods from transportation if an imminent safety hazard exists.
Hazardous Materials in Transportation and Pipeline Systems
A number of actions to ensure the security of hazardous materials in transportation and pipeline systems have been undertaken by the Research and Special Programs Administration (RSPA) and plans for longer-term actions to enhance both hazardous materials transportation security, as well as pipeline security, are underway.
Steps Taken to Ensure Hazardous Materials Transportation Safety:
RSPA issued emergency exemptions to New York City, Arlington County, and the States of New York and Virginia. The exemptions provided relief from requirements of the Hazardous Materials Regulations (HMR) to facilitate clean up and disposal of hazardous materials, including hazardous waste, at the World Trade Center and Pentagon sites.
In addition, RSPA issued an emergency exemption to the Federal Emergency Management Agency (FEMA). The FEMA exemption provided relief from the requirements of the HMR to allow the transportation of various types of hazardous materials to support recovery and relief efforts to, from, and within the disaster areas of New York City and Virginia.
RSPA worked closely with the Federal, State, and local authorities, including the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), the U.S. Postal Service (USPS), and the Environmental Protection Agency, to respond to the anthrax emergencies in Florida, New York, New Jersey, and Washington, DC. With CDC, RSPA provided advice and assistance to USPS on appropriate procedures for transporting anthrax-contaminated mail and developed written guidance on how to transport anthrax-contaminated material for decontamination and disposal. In addition, RSPA issued several emergency exemptions to facilitate clean up and disposal of anthrax-contaminated material at sites in Florida, New York, New Jersey, and Washington, D.C. These exemptions required development of a new packaging protocol for shipment of anthrax-contaminated objects such as mail, office equipment, carpeting, and furniture.
Since September 11th, three security advisories have been issued warning that transportation security can no longer be treated as a secondary or tertiary issue and asking shippers and transporters to review and strengthen security measures, particularly for high-hazard materials. The most recent security advisor